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Abstract 
We propose a theory of low-frequency movements in unemployment based on downward 
real  wage  rigidities.  The  theory  generates  two  main  predictions:  long-run  unemployment 
increases  with  (i)  a  fall  in  long-run  productivity  growth  and  (ii)  a  rise  in  the  variance  of 
productivity growth. Evidence based on U.S. time series and on an international panel strongly 
supports these predictions. The empirical speciﬁcations featuring the variance of productivity 
growth  can  account  for  two  U.S.  episodes  which  a  linear  model  based  only  on  long-run 
productivity growth cannot fully explain. These are the decline in long-run unemployment over 
the 1980s and its rise during the late 2000s. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
This paper proposes a theory in which the low-frequency movements in unemployment are 
explained by the low-frequency movements and the volatility of productivity growth
2. On the one 
hand, an increase in long-run productivity growth lowers long-run unemployment. On the other 
hand, a fall in the variance of productivity growth leads to a fall in long-run unemployment even 
when  long-run  productivity  growth  remains  flat.  The  key  mechanism  that  explains  these 
relationships rests on the assumption that real wages, or more broadly real mar ginal costs, 
adjust more easily upward than downward. 
A recent literature has highlighted the importance of real wage rigidities to explain  labor-
market dynamics at business cycle frequencies. Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Gertler and Trigari 
(2009) and Blanchard and Gali (2010) show that real wage rigidities are important to account for 
a number of stylized facts including the high volatility of employment and vacancies as well as 
the low volatility of real wages.
3 This paper complements these studies by sho wing that real 
rigidities can also account for unemployment dynamics at low frequencies and therefore it offers 
a rationale for the empirical relationship between long-run unemployment, long-run productivity 
growth and its variance. 
Our analysis is motivated by a number of empirical papers, including Bruno and Sachs 
(1985), Phelps (1994), Blanchard et al. (1995), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Staiger, Stock, 
and Watson (2001) and Pissarides and Vallanti (2007), which show time -series and cross-
country evidence in favor of a negative relationship between unemployment  and productivity 
growth at low frequencies. This literature is exempliﬁed by Figure 1 which reports the trend in 
unemployment, the trend in productivity growth and the variance of productivity growth for a 
postwar sample of U.S. data. The time series plotted in the charts on the ﬁrst row are obtained 
computing averages and variances over ﬁve-year rolling windows. The charts on the second 
row display similar objects obtained using the time-varying Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model 
described in Section 3.  
Two main features are evident. First, irrespective of the strategy used to look at the data 
over the long-run, the charts on the ﬁrst column of Figure 1 conﬁrm the negative relationship 
between  long-run  unemployment  and  long-run  productivity  growth  documented  in  earlier 
contributions.
4 Second, a probably less known, yet very interesting, feature of the data is the 
strong positive association between long-run unemployment and the variance of productivity 
growth, which is uncovered in the charts on the second  column. The Great Moderation in the 
variance of productivity growth, for instance, coincides with a sharp fall in the unemployment 
trend. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the theoretical side, we develop a simple model 
                                                 
2
 The terms long-run, trend, mean and low-frequency are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
3
 Pissarides (2009) oﬀers a critical appraisal of wage stickiness as a driver of the cyclical volatility of unemployment in 
search models. 
4
 Results similar to Figure 1 are obtained using ten-year rolling windows, the Hodrick-Prescott and 
Christiano-Fitzgerald ﬁlters.  
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of the labor market based on the assumption of asymmetric real wage rigidities that can account 
for  the  two  empirical  ﬁndings  summarized  in  Figure  1.
5  On  the  empirical  side,  we  evaluate 
formally the predictions of the model by exploiting low-frequency movements in unemployment 
and productivity growth either over time or across countries.  
Figure 1  Long-run unemployment, long-run productivity growth and variance of productivity growth 
for the U.S., computed using ve-year rolling windows for the charts on the first row and 































                                                 
5
 The signiﬁcance of downward real wage rigidity has been documented by a large number of empirical studies on 
micro-data, which are difficult to summarize in a few lines. Prominent examples include Dickens et al. (2008), Du Caju et 
al. (2009), Fagan and Messina (2009), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) for the industrialized world and Calvo et al. (2006) 
for emerging markets.   
 
5 
In our model, wage setters face convex costs for adjusting real wages which can be either 
symmetric  or  asymmetric  up  to  a  limiting  point  that  nests  complete  downward  inﬁexibility. 
Asymmetric  real-wage  rigidities  have  two  key  implications.  First,  for  a  given  volatility  of 
productivity growth, a slowdown in long-run productivity growth generates a signiﬁcant rise in 
long-run unemployment. This is the case because too high real wages make it more likely that 
real revenues will fall relative to costs, thereby forcing ﬁrms to reduce labor demand in order to 
protect proﬁts. With symmetric rigidities, this trade-off is weaker. Second, for a given long-run 
productivity growth, a higher volatility raises the probability of an adverse shock and then leads 
to higher long-run unemployment. Conversely, even when the trend in productivity growth is 
low, a decline in its volatility reduces these risks and causes the unemployment trend to fall.  
We present evidence consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Time series 
for  the  long-run  mean  and  the  variance  of  U.S.  unemployment  and  productivity  growth  are 
obtained using an estimated VAR with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatility á la Cogley 
and Sargent (2005), and Primiceri (2005). Panel regressions are obtained using averages and 
variances over ten-year windows within a dataset of industrialized and emerging economies.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the long-run mean and the variance 
of productivity growth are signiﬁcant determinants of the long-run mean of U.S. unemployment. 
This is true even when we control for changes in the demographic composition of the labor 
force.  Second,  the  empirical  speciﬁcations  that  include  a  measure  of  productivity  growth 
volatility (either linearly or non-linearly) are associated  with a signiﬁcant improvement in the 
goodness  of  ﬁt  relative  to  a  linear  speciﬁcation  in  longrun  productivity  growth  only.  This  is 
exempliﬁed by two episodes that cannot be fully explained by movements of productivity growth 
at low frequencies: the fall in long-run unemployment over the 1980s and its rise during the late 
2000s.  Third,  the  panel  regressions  reveal  that  variation  over  time  is  more  important  than 
variation  across  countries  for  the  mean  and  variance  of  productivity  growth  to  account  for 
ﬁuctuations in the mean of unemployment.  
Few theoretical papers have studied the implications for the long-run relationship between 
unemployment and productivity growth but, to the best of our knowledge, none has emphasized 
the  importance  of  time  variation  in  macroeconomic volatility  for  the  unemployment  trend.  In 
traditional  labor  search  models,  the  relationship  between  productivity  and  unemployment  is 
generally uncertain, as it depends mostly on the extent to which jobs can be upgraded or need 
to be eliminated when new technology arises (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). If firms cannot 
embody the new technology into existing jobs, higher productivity would lead to job destruction 
and higher unemployment (Aghion and Howitt, 1994). If productivity increases for all existing 
jobs,  demand  for  labor  would  increase  and  unemployment  would  decline  (Pissarides,  2000, 
Pissarides  and  Vallanti,  2007).  In  line  with  our  assumption  of  real  wage  rigidities,  Ball  and 
Mankiw (2002) suggest a possible rationale for a negative relationship between unemployment 
and productivity “resting on the idea that wage aspirations‟adjust slowly to shifts in productivity 
growth”, as “workers come to view the rate of real wage increase that they receive as normal 
and fair and to expect it to continue”. 
Our work complements an important literature which has built the case for demographic 
changes in labor force participation to explain low-frequency movements in unemployment (see 
Shimer, 1998, and Francis and Ramey, 2009, among others). We show that the ﬁnding of a 
signiﬁcant role for the trend and the variance of productivity growth to account for the trend in  
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unemployment is robust to controlling for movements in the share of young workers in the labor 
force as well as to using the measure of “genuine” unemployment that Shimer (1998) argues to 
be unaffected by demographics inﬁuences. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and shows the mechanism 
through  which  asymmetric  real  wage  rigidity  generates  a  long-run  relationship  between 
unemployment, productivity growth, and its volatility. Section 3 confronts the predictions of the 
model  to  the  time  series  properties  of  U.S.  data  while  Section  4  provides  evidence  for  an 
international  panel  of  developed  and  developing  economies.  Section  5  concludes.  The 
appendices provide details of the theoretical and empirical models. 
The appendices provide details of the theoretical and empirical models. 
2   THE MODEL 
We  describe  a  closed-economy  model  in  which  there  is  a  continuum  of  inﬁnitely  lived 
households  and  ﬁrms  (both  in  a  [0,1]  interval).  Each  household  derives  utility  from  the 
consumption of a continuum of goods aggregated using a Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index, and 
disutility  from  supplying  one  of  the  varieties  of  labor  to  ﬁrms  in  a  monopolisticcompetitive 
market. Each ﬁrm hires all varieties of labor to produce one of the continuum of consumption 
goods  and  operates  in  a  monopolistic-competitive  market.  The  economy  is  subject  to  an 
aggregate productivity shock. This is denoted by At, whose logarithmic at is distributed as a 
Brownian motion with drift g and variance ˃
2 
                    (1) 
where Bt denotes a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance. 
Household j has preferences over time given by 
(2) 
where the expectation operator Et0(·) is deﬁned by the shock processes (1) and ρ > 0 is the 
rate of time preference. Current utility depends on the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregate of 





where θp > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods and ct
j
(i) is household 
j’s consumption  of  the  variety  produced  by  ﬁrm i. An  appropriate  consumption-based  price 





where pt(i) is the price of the single good i.  
The  utility  ﬁow  is  logarithmic  in  the  consumption  aggregate.  In  (2),  labor  disutility  is 
assumed to be isoelastic with respect to the  labor supplied lt(j), with η ≥ 0  measuring the 
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.





where Qt is the stochastic nominal discount factor in capital markets where claims to monetary 
units are traded; Wt(j) is the nominal wage for labor of variety j, and Πt
j
 is the proﬁt income of 
household j.  
Starting with the consumption decisions, household j chooses goods demand,{ct
j
(i)}, to 
maximize (2) under the intertemporal budget constraint (3), taking prices as given. The ﬁrst-







where the multiplier ξ does not vary over time. The index j is omitted from the consumption‟s 
ﬁrst-order conditions, because we are assuming perfect consumption risk-sharing through a set 
of state-contingent claims to monetary units.  
Before we turn to the labor supply decision, we analyze the ﬁrms‟problem. We assume that 
the labor used to produce each good i is a CES aggregate, L(i), of the continuum of individual 




with an elasticity of substitution θw > 1. Here li,t(j) is the demand of ﬁrm i for labor of type j. 
Given that each differentiated type of labor is supplied in a monopolistic-competitive market, the 




where Wt  is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate wage index 
 
(7) 
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whereas the aggregate demand of labor of type j is given by 
(8) 




We assume a common linear technology for the production of all goods 
(9) 
for a parameter α with 0 < α < 1 measuring decreasing return to scale. Proﬁts of the generic 
ﬁrm i, Πt(i), are given by 
 
 




where total output is equal in equilibrium to aggregate consumption (Yt = Ct). We assume that 
ﬁrms  can  freely  adjust  their  prices.  Standard  optimality  conditions  under  monopolistic 




where  µp  ≡  θp/[(θp  -  1)α]  >  1  denotes  the  mark-up  of  prices  over  marginal  costs.
7  An 
implication of (10) is that labor income is a constant fraction of total income 
 
(11) 




depends negatively on the real wage and positively on productivity. Demand of labor is critical 
to  understand  the  main  intuition  behind  our  results. When  productivity  falls  and  real  wage 
remains too high, ﬁrms have to cut on labor to protect their proﬁts.  
In  what  follows,  we  deﬁne wt(j) = Wt(j)/Pt  as  the  real  wage  for  worker  of  type j  and          
wt = Wt /Pt as the aggregate real wage.
8 The choice of real wages is modelled in a similar way 
                                                 
7
 See the Appendix for the derivation of equation (10). 
8
 Notice that equation (11) holds because of the assumption of ﬁexible prices which is necessary for analytical 
tractability.   
 
9 
to the monopoly-union model of Dunlop (1944). Given ﬁrms‟demand (8), a household of type j 
(or a union) chooses real wages in a monopolistic-competitive market to maximize (2) under the 
intertemporal budget constraint (3) taking as given prices {Qt} and the other relevant aggregate 









Households would then supply as much labor as demanded by ﬁrms in (8) at the chosen 
real wages. In deriving π(·) we have used (4), (8) and (11). 
2.1  Flexible wages 
We ﬁrst analyze the case in which wages are set without any friction, so that they can be 
moved freely. With ﬁexible wages, maximization of (13) corresponds to per-period maximization 
and implies the following optimality condition 
(14) 
where πwj(·) is the derivative of π(·) with respect to the ﬁrst argument. Since equation (14) 
holds for each j, there is a unique equilibrium where wt(j) = wt = wt 
f
 and in which wt 
f 
denotes 
the equilibrium level of real wages under ﬁexible wages. Equation (14) deﬁnes the equilibrium 
level of labor under ﬁexible wages, which is a constant given by 
 
 
where the wage mark-up is deﬁned by µw ≡ θw/(θw - 1). Real wages are proportional to the 
aggregate productivity shock 
(15) 
2.2  Deﬁnition of unemployment rate 
Following  Gal￬  (2010),  we  deﬁne  the  unemployment  rate  as  the  difference  between  the 
“notional”  amount  of  labor  that  workers  would  be  willing  to  supply  in  a  competitive  and 
frictionless market at the current real wage and the amount of labor currently employed. Given 
our preference speciﬁcations, “notional” labor supply, Lt
s
, is deﬁned as the amount of labor that 






Accordingly, the unemployment rate ut is given by ut = ln Lt
s
 - ln Lt. Combining (16) with 




f denotes the unemployment rate in the ﬁexible-wage model given by uf = ln µw/η and 
where the employment gap xt, equal to the output gap, is deﬁned as the log difference between 
actual labor and the ﬁexible-wage level 
 
(18) 
With ﬁexible wages, unions set too high real wages and at these real wages workers would 
be willing to supply more labor than currently demanded by ﬁrms. Unemployment is given by uf 
and  indeed  captures  the  unions‟monopoly  power.  With  real  wage  rigidities,  unemployment 
depends also on the output gap and can vary over time inversely proportional to the variation of 
the output gap. This second component will be the most relevant in our model to explain the 
dynamics of unemployment at low frequencies.  
2.3  Sticky real wages 
In this section, we investigate a general model in which real wages are allowed to adjust 
either upward or downward but with some cost. In particular, we allow for both symmetric and 




for  some  parameters  χ,  λ,  where  we  have  deﬁned  the  rate  of  real  wage  changes  as                  
πR,t(j)dt  ≡  dwt(j)/wt(j).  In  particular  χ  is  a  measure  of  the  costs  of  adjustment,  while  λ 
measures  the  asymmetries  in  the  cost  function.
9  When  λ  →  0,  we  retrieve  the  standard 
symmetric quadratic cost function 
 
 
while when λ < 0 it is more costly to adjust real wages downward than upward and viceversa 
for λ > 0. When λ goes to minus inﬁnity, we nest the case in which real wages are inﬁexible 
downward and fully ﬁexible upward. In the next section, we discuss this case more extensively 
as it allows us to derive a closed form solution for the long-run mean of unemployment. 
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 Varian (1974) has ﬁrst introduced this speciﬁcation. Kim and Murcia (2009) have recently used it to model asymmetric 




In this setting, we assume that wage setters maximize (13) taking into account the present 












and in which we have used the results that (dwt(j))
2 = (dwt)
2 = dwt(j)dAt = dwtdAt = 0 and 
deﬁned g' ≡ g + (1/2)˃
2 .
11 
Using the expression for the value function given by (20) and (21), we obtain the optimal 









Using (20), (21) and (22), we show, in Appendix D, that the marginal costs of changing real 




Under a quadratic cost function, we can simplify equation (24) to 
 
 
                                                 
10
 With similar tools, Abel and Eberly (1994) have analyzed costly investment decisions. 
11
 The fact that dwt has the same properties of dwt(j) follows from the symmetry of the equilibrium.  
 
12 
which is the continuos-time non-linear version of the Rotemberg‟s (1982) cost of adjustment 
model where the stickiness is applied to real wages rather than to nominal wages and where we 
have deﬁned k ≡ (θw - 1)/(µpχ
2).  
Using the deﬁnition of the employment gap (18), equation (12) implies that 
 
(26) 
and therefore a diffusion process for xt of the form 
 
(27) 
which can be used to derive the long-run distribution and in particular the long-run mean of the 
employment gap, x. To this end, we need to solve for the unknown functional πR(xt). By deﬁning 
p(xt) ≡ hπ(πR(xt))/χ
2, the optimality condition (23) implies 
 
(28) 
In particular, using Ito‟s Lemma in equation (24) and the difusion process (27), we obtain 
that the functional p(xt) satisﬁes the following differential equation 
(29) 
 
Notice again that with quadratic adjustment costs πR(xt) = p(xt). We use (28) and (29) to 
solve for the functional πR(xt) and p(xt) and then (27) to solve for the long-run distribution of xt, 
if it exists. 
2.3.1    The productivity growth-unemployment trade-off  
The  differential  equation  (29)  is  solvable  using  approximation  methods.  In  particular,  an 
educated guess would be to approximate the solution p(xt) with a ﬁnite-order polynomial.
12 An 
interesting  case,  which  can  be  helpful  to  discuss  ﬁrst,  is  that  of  a  ﬁrst-order  polynomial. 
Consider the symmetric quadratic adjustment cost model, with λ → 0, and (1+η)xt consider 
small deviations of xt from zero. In particular, approximate the term e
 (1+η)xt in (29) as e
 (1+η)xt ≈ 
1+ (1+ η)xt. In this case, the solution for p(xt), which is equal to πR(xt), is linear and of the form 




                                                 
12
 This is an educated guess since both the exponential in (29) and the logarithmic in (28) can be represented with 
inﬁnite-order polynomials, althought the latter only when |p(xt)| < 1.  
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From the stochastic differential equation (27), it can be seen that the employment gap, xt, 
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which in the long run converges to a normal distribution 
with mean given by 
where x∞ denotes the long-run level of the employment gap. The above equation displays a 
positive  relationship  between  the  employment  gap  and  productivity  growth  and  therefore  a 
negative linear relationship between unemployment and productivity growth 
 
where we have used (17). Notice that at lower levels of real-wage stickiness (lower χ) the link 
between  unemployment  and  productivity  growth  is  weakened  and  unemployment  becomes 
close to the frictional level. Furthermore, in this linear solution, there is no relationship between 
unemployment and the volatility of productivity growth.  
In order to ﬁnd a role for volatility,  we need to take at least a second-order polynomial 
approximation  for  p(xt)  and  πR(xt).
13  However,  as  shown  in  Figure  2,  when  we  assume  a 
symmetric adjustment-cost function, λ → 0, we ﬁnd that the trade-off between unemployment 
and productivity growth is negligible and the curve is almost vertical. Moreover the variance has 
a small role in accounting for signiﬁcant shifts in such a trade-off.
14 
 
Figure 2  Model with symmetric real-wage rigidities: long-run relationships between the mean of 
unemployment, E(u∞), and the mean of productivity growth, g, for different values of the 
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 The approximations are accurate as long as xt, p(xt) and πR(xt) remain appropriately bounded within the unit circle. 
In particular, a larger λ in absolute value requires stricter bounds for xt. 
14
 In the Figure, we use the following calibration: η = 2.5, ρ = 0.04, α = 0.66,θ = 6, µp= 1.15, µf  = 0.05, χ = 1.77. In 
particular, within a Calvo model the assumption on χ would translate into an average duration of contracts on real 
wages equal to one year and a half. Note that, as shown in Figure 1, the VAR estimates of the variance of productivity 
growth range between 0.0001 and 0.0005, implying standard deviations in the range 1% to 2.3 per cent.  
 
14 
A  stronger  trade-off  and  a  more  important  role  for  volatility  emerge  when  there  are 
asymmetries in real wage rigidities, as shown in Figure 3 where we let the parameter λ take 
negative values. As λ decreases the trade-off becomes more pronounced in a way that it also 
depends on the level of productivity growth. Moreover, the lower  λ the higher the impact of 
volatility on unemployment. This channel is larger the closer the trend in productivity growth is to 
zero. 
 
Figure 3  Model with asymmetric real-wage rigidities: long-run relationships between the mean of 
unemployment, E(u∞), and the mean of productivity growth, g, for different values of the 
standard deviation of productivity growth, ˃, and different levels of asymmetries, λ. 














When there are asymmetric rigidities on the downward side,  lower levels of productivity 
growth are associated with higher unemployment because bad productivity shocks are more 
likely to be absorbed by lower employment demand on the side of ﬁrms, as in (12). Firms cut on 
labor to protect their proﬁts since real wages cannot fall much. At these too high real wages 
workers  would  like  to  supply  more  labor  than  what  ﬁrms  demand.  When  the  volatility  of 
productivity growth is high, these bad draws on productivity are even more likely requiring a 
larger adjustment on labor. 
The  mechanisms  underlined  by  our  model  would  be  absent  in  a  simple  framework  of 
symmetric  real  wage  rigidities  unless  there  is  a  substantial  and  persistent  misalignment 
between real wages growth and productivity growth. Not only would a model with symmetric 
real rigidities imply a weak relationship between productivity growth and unemployment but also 
no role for the volatility of productivity growth in explaining unemployment. 
In the next section, we discuss more extensively the results in the limiting case of complete 
downward real wage inﬁexibility.  
2.4  Downward real wage rigidity  
In this section, we assume that real wages are completely rigid on the downward side and 
ﬁexible on the upward side. This model can be solved in closed-form and its derivation of its  
 
15 
solution  is  helpful  to  illustrate  the  inﬁuence  of  volatility  on  unemployment.
15  With  complete 
downward wage inﬁexibility, the wage setters maximize (13) under 
(30) 
with wt0  >  0.  In  other  words,  agents  choosea    non-decreasing  positive  real  wage  path  to 
maximize (13). In appendix E, we show that this optimization problem leads to a simple decision 
rule. Wage setters compare their past choice on real wages to a current desired real wage. 
Whenever the past real wage is higher than the desired one, they are constrained by the past 
decisions and cannot move their real wage. Otherwise, whenever the current desired real wage 
is higher than the past real wage, they adjust upward to that desired real wage, wt
d
, which is a 
fraction of the ﬁexible-wage level and given by 
(31) 
where c(·) is a non-negative function of the model parameters: 
(32) 
and γ(·) is the following non-negative function 
 
 
which is derived in Appendix E.  
Agents‟ optimizing behavior in the presence of exogenous downward real wage rigidities 
implies an endogenous tendency for limiting the upward revisions in real wages. When wages 
adjust upward, they adjust to the desired level wt
d
, which is always below the ﬁexible-wage level 
by  a  factor  c(·).  Indeed,  optimizing  wage  setters  choose  an  adjustment  rule  that  tries  to 
minimize the inefficiencies of downward real wage inﬁexibility. Wage setters are worried to get 
locked with an excessively high real wage were future unfavorable shocks require a real wage 
decline (as downward real wage rigidities would imply a fall in employment). As a consequence, 
optimizing agents refrain from excessive real wage increases when favorable shocks require 
upward adjustment, pushing current employment above the ﬁexible-case level. 
The above optimizing decision rule nests also a myopic rule in which agents do not take 
into account the consequences of the current real wage choice for future decisions and simply 
adjust real wages to a ﬁexible-wage level whenever this level is above their previous choice. In 
this case wt = wt
f
, whenever dwt > 0. This myopic rule, which will be of particular interest for 
the  empirical  section  that  follows,  corresponds  to  the  limiting  case  in  which  agents  do  not 
discount the future at all, i.e. when ρ → ∞ implying c → 1. 
                                                 
15
 Benigno and Ricci (2010) study the implications of a model with downward nominal wage rigidities.  
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2.4.1    The productivity growth-unemployment trade-off 
We can now solve for the equilibrium level of employment and characterize the productivity-
unemployment trade-off in the presence of downward real wage rigidities. Since we have shown 
that wt ≥ c(·)
1−α wt
f
 equation (26) implies that -∞ ≤ xt ≤ -ln c(·). The existence of downward 
real wage rigidities endogenously adds an upward barrier on the employment gap. Since at 
follows a Brownian motion with drift g and standard deviation ˃, also xt is going to follow a 
Brownian motion with mean g/(1 - α) and variance (˃ /(1 - α))
2 but with a regulating barrier at  
-ln c(·). The probability distribution function for such process can be computed at each point in 
time.
16  We  are  interested  in  studying  whether  thi s  probability  distribution  converges  to  an 
equilibrium distribution when t → ∞, in order to characterize the long-run probability distribution 
for employment, and thus unemployment. Standard results assure that this is the case when the 
drift of the Brownian motion of xt is positive, which requires g > 0. In this case, it can be shown 
that the long-run cumulative distribution of xt, denoted with P(·), is given by 
 
for 0 ≤ z ≤ -ln c(·) where x
∞ denotes the long-run equilibrium level of the employment gap. We 
can compute the long-run mean of the employment gap, 
 
(33) 
and therefore the long-run mean of unemployment 
 
(34) 
In  this  model  the  average  growth  rate  of  real  wages  converges  in  the  long  run  to  the 
productivity trend, g for any positive g.
17 In the presence of downward real wage rigidities, we 
ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of productivity 
growth, which is shifted by the volatility of productivity. The shift is quantitatively important as 
shown  in  Figure  4.  For  given  growth  of  productivity,  a  higher  volatility  implies  a  higher 
unemployment  rate.  For  given  volatility,  a  lower  productivity  growth  implies  a  higher 
unemployment rate. Notice that under the myopic adjustment rule, in which ρ → ∞, the mean of 
unemployment rate is simply given by 
(35) 
 
as the function c(·) in (34) is now equal to 1. Indeed, a value of c(·) below one is capturing the 
beneﬁts in terms of lower unemployment due to the intertemporal optimizing behavior of wage 
setters who are taking into account the future consequences of their current real wage choices 
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 See Cox and Miller (1990, pp. 223-225) for a detailed derivation. 
17
 This is an appealing feature of the limiting case in contrast with the model of symmetric rigidities.  
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and therefore set lower real wages when adjusting upward. Absent this channel, unemployment 
would simply reﬁect the structural level of unemployment, u 
f, and the costs of the downward 
real  wage  rigidity  constraint  given  by  the  ratio  between  the  variance  and  the  mean  of 
productivity  growth.  The  relevance  of  this  ratio  to  explain  long-run  unemployment  will  be 
investigated in the empirical analysis below. 
 
Figure 4  Model with downward real-wage rigidities: long-run relationships between the mean of 
unemployment, E(u∞), and the mean of productivity growth, g, for different values of 













3  EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES  
A key  prediction of the theoretical model is that the variance of productivity growth has 
explanatory  power  for  the  mean  of  the  unemployment  rate  over  and  above  the  mean  of 
productivity growth. There are two ways we can take this prediction to the data. First, focusing 
on a single country, we can construct time-varying measures of mean and volatility, and then 
ask whether periods of higher variance in productivity growth are associated with a higher mean 
of unemployment, for a given mean of productivity  growth. Second,  we can  investigate  this 
relationship within a panel of countries. This section describes the strategy and the results for 
the ﬁrst avenue. Section 4 presents evidence based on the second avenue.  
As  for  exploiting  the  time  variation  within  a  single  country,  the  U.S.  Great  Moderation 
appears a natural candidate for assessing the empirical merits of our theory. During the ﬁrst half 
of  the  1980s,  the  volatility  of  several  measures  of  real  activity,  including  real  GDP  growth, 
residential investment and unemployment fell sharply in the U.S.. To the extent that productivity 
growth also showed a pronounced decline in volatility, our model predicts that this should have 
been accompanied by a pronounced fall in the mean of unemployment. Figure 1 provides prima 
facie  evidence  in  support  of  this  prediction.  In  this  section,  we  ﬁrst  spell  out  the  way  the 
estimates in Figures 1 have been constructed and we then use the time-varying measures of 
mean and volatility for productivity growth to assess the ability of the model to account for the 
low-frequency variation in the unemployment rate.   
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3.1  Measuring unemployment and productivity trends  
The econometric literature offers several ways to model time-variation in the variance of the 
stochastic disturbances as well as in the autoregressive coeﬃ cients of stochastic processes. 
Some  of  the  best-known  examples  in  macroeconomics  include  models  of  AutoRegressive 
Conditional  Heteroskedasticity  (ARCH),  Regime-Switching  volatility  models  (RS)  and  Vector 
AutoRegressions with stochastic volatility (VAR). It is worth emphasizing that our theoretical 
model has predictions for the rate of unemployment in the long-run. The focus on the long-run 
makes the ARCH speciﬁcation less attractive than the RS and the VAR. Furthermore, the notion 
of real rigidities in the labor market hinges upon the presumption that changes in productivity 
diffuse gradually, rather than abruptly, to the rest of the economy, thereby making the RS model 
less attractive than the time-varying VAR for our purposes.  
Following the literature pioneered by Cogley and Sargent (2001 and 2005), and followed 
among others by Primiceri (2005) and Sargent and Surico (2011), we model the evolution of 
productivity growth, gt, real wage growth, Δwt, and the rate of unemployment, ut, using a VAR 
with drifting coeﬃ cients and stochastic volatility. The drifting coefficients enable us to construct 
a time-varying measure for the mean of the endogenous variables. Both the drifting coeﬃ cients 
and the stochastic volatility allow us to construct a time-varying measure of volatility.  
The statistical model is a VAR(p) of the following form: 
(36) 
where Xt collects the ﬁrst p lags of Yt , θt is a matrix of time-varying parameters, et are reduced-
form errors, Yt is deﬁned as Yt ≡ [gt, Δwt,ut]' , and ρ is set equal to 2. The parameters of the 
error covariance matrix, Var(et) ≡ Ωt, are assumed to evolve as geometric random walks while 
the parameters of the matrix of autoregressive coefficients are assumed to evolve as random 
walks.  
The time-series for long-run unemployment and long-run productivity growth are computed 
as  local-to-date  t  approximations  to  the  mean  of  the  endogenous  variables  of  the  VAR, 
evaluated at the posterior mean E(θt|T). Let us rewrite equation (36) in companion form: 
 
where zt contains current and lagged values of Yt, Ct|T is the vector of intercepts, Dt|T  is the 
vector of stacked time-varying parameters and ςt is a conformable vector containing et and 
zeros. Following Cogley and Sargent (2005), the long-run mean for the vector zt can then be 
computed as: 
(37) 
where, given the order of the variables in the VAR, the ﬁrst and third elements of    correspond 
to the mean of productivity growth,      and the mean of unemployment,     at time t.  
The time-series for the unconditional variance of the variables in the VAR can be estimated 
using the integral of the spectral density over all frequencies,                    , where ft|T is deﬁned 




The element (1,1) of the matrix ft|T(ω) represents the unconditional variance of productivity 
growth,   ,  at time t. Details of the model speciﬁcation and estimation method are provided in 
Appendix B.  
The data were collected in September 2010 from the Fred database available at the Federal 
Reserve bank of St. Louis. Productivity is the non-farm business sector output per hour of all 
persons (acronym „OPHNFB‟), wage is the non-farm business sector real compensation per 
hour  (acronym  „COMPRNFB‟),  and  unemployment  is  the  rate  of  civilian  unemployment  for 
persons  with  16  years  of  age  or  older  (acronym  „UNRATE‟).
18  All  variables  are  seasonally 
adjusted at the source. As we are not interested to explain quarter on quarter changes, we 
compute annual growth rates for productivity and real wage to smooth out the high frequency 
components in the data. Growth rates are approximated by log differences. Results are robust 
to using quarterly changes. To calibrate the priors for the VAR coeﬃ cients, we use a training 
sample of thirteen years, from 1949Q1-1961Q4. The results hereafter, then, refer to the period 
1962Q1 to 2010Q2.  
We  can  therefore  compute  the  estimates  of  long  run  unemployment  (    ),  long  run 
productivity (   ), and the variance  of productivity (   ) from the estimates of the  VAR (36) 
together with the formulas (37) and (38). These series are shown in Figure 1.  
3.2  The ﬁt of the linear model  
This section assesses empirically the main predictions of the model: the mean of unem-
ployment  depends  negatively  from  the  mean  of  productivity  growth  and  positively  from  the 
variance of productivity growth. More formally, we can write: 
 
where the vector ϑ ≡ (η, ρ, α, λ, u
f ) contains the relevant parameters of the model and f(·) is a 
generic  non-linear  function  which  in  the  limiting  case  of  downward  real  wage  inﬁexibility 
corresponds to (34). 
A natural benchmark of comparison for this exercise is the linear speciﬁcation employed in 
earlier  contributions  (see  for  instance  Pissarides  and  Vallanti,  2007),  which  relates  long-run 
unemployment to long-run productivity growth: 
(39) 
where  a  and  b  are  parameters  and  εt  is  a  well-behaved  stochastic  disturbance.  Using  the 
estimates of the VAR derived in the previous Section, we obtain the following OLS estimates for 
equation (39):  
(40) 
where  standard  errors  are  reported  in  parentheses.  The  R
2  of  the  regression  is  0.77.  The 
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 To make our empirical results comparable with earlier contributions (see for instance Staiger, Stock and Watson, 
2001), we measure productivity as the ratio of output to total hours in the non-farm business sector, Y/L. This measure 
is computed and released by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. In our model, productivity is deﬁned as Y/Lα and the ﬁrst 
diﬀerence of its logarithm is denoted by g. It should be noted, however, that assuming a standard labour to capital ratio 
of 2/3 the correlation between g and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the logarithm of Y/L is 0.91 over our sample period.  
 
20 
estimates  of  this  simple  model  show  that  there  is  a  tight  negative  relationship  between 
productivity  growth  and  unemployment  in  the  long-run.  In  particular,  a  1%  fall  in  longrun 
productivity growth corresponds to an increase in long-run unemployment of 2.24 percentage 
points.  Alternatively,  an  increase  of  one  standard  deviation  (0.002)  in  longrun  productivity 
growth would lower long-run unemployment by 0.47 percentage points.  
Figure 5 confronts long-run unemployment, depicted as red continuous line, with the ﬁtted 
values from equation (40), depicted as blue dotted line. The linear model does a good job in 
 
Figure 5  Trend in the unemployment rate implied by the estimates of the time-varying VAR (36) 
using formula (37), and ﬁtted values of the Linear Model of equation (40) and of the 


















tracking qualitatively the movements in the unemployment rate. However, a closer inspection of 
the ﬁgure reveals that neither the decline in trend unemployment between 1984 and 1992 nor 
the rise since the late 1990s can be adequately explained by the linear model, whose ﬁt seems 
particularly inadequate to explain the developments in long-run unemployment since 2007.  
The theoretical model of section 2 suggests two departures from the linear speciﬁcation 
(39). First, it highlights the relevance of the  variance of productivity  growth. Consistent  with 
Figure 1, movements in the variance of productivity growth coincide with movements in long-run 
unemployment, especially during the periods where the mean of productivity growth was ﬁat. 
Second, under the limiting case of downward real  wage  inﬁexibility, the model allows  us to 
derive a nonlinear relationship between unemployment and productivity growth in closed form. 
To appreciate the relative importance of these modiﬁcations, we proceed in two steps. First we 
augment  the  linear  speciﬁcation  in  (39)  with  a  vari-ance  term.  Then,  we  estimate  the 
relationship between unemployment and productivity growth nonlinearly.  
More speciﬁcally, we estimate the following linear speciﬁcation in both the mean and the 




The variance term is highly signiﬁcant and the R
2 is now 0.95, a signiﬁcant increase relative 
to the estimates in (40) which are based on a linear speciﬁcation in long-run productivity growth 
only.
19 The improvement is evident from Figure 5. The ﬁtted values from equation (41) track 
unemployment trend far better than the linear model (40), and in particular they allow the model 
to account fully for the decline in long-run unemployment of the 1980 and the rise of the late 
2000s. The coefficient on the productivity mean is somewhat lower than in the bivariate case. 
The  effect  of  the  variance  is  also  economically  signiﬁcant:  an  increase  of  one  standard 
deviation (0.00005) would imply a rise in long-run unemployment of about 0.25 percent. The 
estimates in Figure 1 reveal that the variance of productivity growth declined from 0.0003 to 
about 0.0002 during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s when long-run unemployment fell from about 
6.5% to 5.5%. Together with the estimates in (41), this implies that the decline in the variance of 
productivity growth can account for about 50% of the fall in long-run unemployment during this 
episode.  Between  2000  and  2009,  the  variance  of  productivity  growth  has  increased  from 
0.00024 to 0.00038 against the backdrop of a rise in long-run unemployment from 5% to 6%. 
These  numbers  imply  a  70%  contribution  of  the  variance  of  productivity  growth  to  long-run 
unemployment during the 2000s.  
3.3  Controlling for demographics 
An  important  strand  of  the  literature  has  convincingly  argued  that  changes  in  the 
demographic  composition  of  the  labour  force  aﬀects  the  low-frequency  movements  in 
unemployment  (Shimer,  1998),  the  low-frequency  movements  in  productivity  (Francis  and 
Ramey, 2009) and the variance of real output growth (Jaimovich and Siu, 2009).  
In this section, we want to assess the extent to which the estimates of the linear models 
above may vary once we control for demographics. To this end, we construct time series for the 
share of workers in the labor force with age (i) between 16 and 21 (as in Francis and Ramey, 
2009), (ii) between 16 and 34 (as in Shimer, 1998), and (i) the sum of the shares of workers in 
the 16-29 and the 60-64 windows of age (as in Jaimovich and Siu, 2009). Furthermore, we run 
a regression of the unemployment rate on a constant and the unemployment rate of workers in 
prime age (deﬁned as those between 35 and 64 years), and then use the ﬁtted values from this 
regression in place of the unemployment rate in the VAR to construct the trend of what Shimer 
(1998)  refers  to  as  a  measure  of  genuine  unemployment  which  is  not  aﬀected  by 
demographics.
20  
The  labor  force  series  were  collected  in  September  2010  from  the  Bureau   of  Labor 
Statistics using data gathered in the Current Population Survey. These data can also be used to 
compute the unemployment rate for prime -age workers. The series used in this section are 
reported in Appendix A. The results of these sensitivity analyses are collected in Table 1, which 
presents estimates for the linear model using the trend of productivity growth and the measures 
of labor force share in columns (1) to (3), and then adding the variance of productivity growth in 
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 Similar results are obtained using averages and variances of unemployment and productivity growth computed over 
either ﬁve-or ten-year rolling windows. 
20
 The estimates of this regression are: 0.0075 (.0014) for the intercept and 1.2716 (.0340) for the slope. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. R



































































































































columns (5) to (7). The estimates for the speciﬁcations using  Shimer‟s measure of genuine 
unemployment  are  displayed  in  columns  (4)  and  (8),  without  and  with  the  variance  of 
productivity growth respectively.  
Two  main  results  emerge  from  Table  1.  First,  controlling  for  demographics  does  not 
overturn  our  ﬁnding  of  a  signiﬁcant  role  for  both  the  long-run  mean  and  the  variance  of 
productivity  growth  to  explain  low-frequency  movements  in  unemployment.  In  particular,  the 
estimated coefficient on      in columns (5) to (8) is never statistically different from the estimates 
in (41), which omits any demographic measures. Similar results are obtained for the estimated 
coefficient  on    although  in  column  (4)  this  is  statistically  lower  than  the  estimates  in  (40). 
Second, in line with Shimer (1998), Francis and Ramey (2009) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009), 
the composition of the labor force has a signiﬁcant inﬁuence on the low-frequency movements 
in  unemployment,  although  its  statistical  and  economic  signiﬁcance  appear  muted  once  the 
variance of productivity growth is added as additional regressor in the columns (5) to (7). The 
ﬁnding of an important role for the variance of productivity growth is robust to using Shimer‟s 
measure of genuine unemployment in column (8), although the coefficient on the productivity 
growth trend is statistically smaller than in (41).  
In summary, we conclude that the long-run mean and the variance of productivity growth 
are signiﬁcant determinants of U.S. long-run unemployment over and above changes in the 
demographic composition of the labor force in the post-WWII period. 
3.4   The ﬁt of the nonlinear model 
The results above point toward a signiﬁcant role for asymmetries in real wage rigidities. To 
investigate this channel further, we estimate the non-linear equation implied by the model under 




Unfortunately, the parameters α and η are not separately identiﬁed. Nevertheless, we can 
still estimate a reduced-form version of (42), which we refer to as the “unrestricted model”. 
 The estimates of the unrestricted model yield so high estimates for ρ as to imply values of 
the  function  c(·)  very  close  to  one,  which  correspond  to  the  case  of  myopic  agents.  We 
therefore estimate also a simpliﬁed version of the theoretical model in (42) where we impose     
c = 1 prior to estimation:  
(43) 
 
The  simpliﬁed  version  (43),  which  is  linear  in  the  variance-to-mean  ratio  of  productivity 
growth, is referred to as the „restricted model‟.  
The ﬁtted values associated with the non-linear unrestricted model and with the variance-to-
mean  restricted  model  are  presented  in  Figure  6.  Both  speciﬁcations  track  long-run 
unemployment remarkably well and they clearly outperform the linear speciﬁcation of Figure 5 
which is based on long-run productivity growth only. In particular, the speciﬁcations in (42) and 
(43)  capture  well  the  fall  in  long-run  unemployment  during  the  1984-1992  period  and  its 
increase during the (late) 2000s.  
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Figure 6  Trend in the unemployment rate implied by the estimates of the time-varying VAR (36) 
using formula (37), and ﬁtted values for the Non-linear Unrestricted model of equation (42) 


















The non-linear model has a R
2 of 0.92 and a point estimate (standard error) for the ﬁexible-
wage unemployment rate, µ
f, of 3.88% (0.29). The restriction implied by the variance-to-mean 
ratio implies only a modest deterioration in the goodness of ﬁt with a R
2 of 0.90 and a coefficient 
µ
f of 3.41% (0.05). This suggests that the simpliﬁed expression (43) provides  a reasonable 
approximation to the unrestricted speciﬁcation (42). Notice again that in the simpliﬁed model 
(43) with myopic agents, downward real wage rigidities play a crucial role through the inﬁuence 
of the variance-to-mean ratio of productivity growth in aﬀecting unemployment in the long-run. 
In  summary,  versions  of  the  theoretical  model  that  feature  strong  asymmetries  in  real 
rigidities appear to account for the low-frequency movements in the U.S. unemployment rate 
which a model with symmetric real rigidity has hard time to explain. Similar results, available 
upon request, are obtained using Shimer‟s measure of genuine unemployment, which controls 











4  INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE  
In this section, we explore the empirical implications of the model in Section 2 within a 
panel  of  international  data.  In  particular,  we  are  interested  in  whether  the  variance  of 
productivity  growth  has  predictive  power  for  the  mean  of  unemployment  across  different 
countries  over  a  sufficiently  long  period  of  time.  Our  international  dataset  is  an  unbalanced 
panel of quarterly observations for developed and developing economies over the post-WWII 
period.
21  
For each country i, we compute over a window of ten years: 
1)  the mean of unemployment,      ; 
2)  the mean of productivity growth,      ; 
3)  the variance of productivity growth,        ; 
4)  the ratio between the variance of productivity growth and the mean itof productivity 
growth, V-to-M ratioit. 
Unemployment  is  taken  from  various  data  sources  (World  Development  Indicators,  IFS, 
WEO, OECD, and Datastream, via splicing in the respective order); the sample spans the years 
between 1960 and 2008. For productivity, we use real GDP per worker where real GDP is taken 
from employment World Development Indicators, IFS, and WEO (via splicing in the respective 
order) and employment is taken from the same sources as unemployment. Prior to estimation, 
we drop observations for which there are less than eight periods in a ten-year window. The 
estimates  are  displayed  in  Table  2  and  each  column  refers  to  a  different  speciﬁcation  and 
estimation  method.  The  estimates  in  the  ﬁrst  eight  columns  are  based  on  the  Fixed-effect 
Estimator (FE) with time dummies included only in the columns (5) to (8). The last two columns 
refer to the Between  Estimator (BE) and  will allow  us to  assess the  extent to  which cross-
country variation in the mean of unemployment is due to crosscountry variation in the mean and 
variance  of  productivity  growth.  In  all  speciﬁcations,  standard  errors  are  adjusted  for 
heteroskedasticity.  In  the  FE  columns,  standard  errors  are  also  adjusted  for  intra-group 
correlation. In line with the theory, the coefficient on average productivity growth is negative and 
the  coefficient  on  the  variance  of  productivity  growth  is  positive.  While  the  latter  is  always 
signiﬁcant, the former is signiﬁcant only in the speciﬁcations that do not include time dummies. 
A possible interpretation of this result is that the countries in our panel share a common trend in 
productivity  growth  which  absorbs the negative correlation  with national  unemployment. The 
coefficients are somewhat lower than those estimated in the previous section, in part reﬁecting 
higher standard deviations for all variables in this international sample. Indeed, the coefficient in 
column 3 indicates that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in productivity growth 
(about 0.02) is to lower average unemployment by a full percentage point.  
The signiﬁcance of the variance of productivity growth is strongly supported. The estimated 
coefficient on the variance to mean ratio is positive and statistically different from zero in both 
speciﬁcations (4) and (8), and therefore it accords with the prediction of the model of section 2. 
                                                 
21
 The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,P.R.:Hong Kong, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Prov.of China, Thailand, United 




















































































































































As for the goodness of ﬁt, the speciﬁcations that contain the variance term (either linearly 
or as a ratio) have the largest R
2. The coefficient reported in column 3 suggests that the effect 
of a one standard deviation increase in the variance of productivity growth (about 0.0005) is to 
lower average unemployment by more than one percentage point. 
While  the  between-country  effects  of  average  productivity  growth  on  average 
unemployment (columns 9 and 10) are not statistically different from the within-country effects 
(columns 1 to 8), the results of the last two columns reveal that the effects across countries are 
imprecisely  estimated.  The  FE  speciﬁcations  are  associated  with  a  better  ﬁt  than  the  BE 
speciﬁcations, thereby corroborating the view that the theory is more successful in explaining 
ﬁuctuations in long-run unemployment over time. This ﬁnding is not surprising as the cross-
sectional dimension of the long-run unemployment rates is more likely to reﬁect other factors 
such as labor market structures and institutions. 
5  CONCLUSIONS  
A simple model of the labor market with sticky real wages implies that unemployment and 
productivity growth are negatively related in the long-run. When coupled with the assumption of 
asymmetric  wage  rigidities,  we  show  that  the  model  generates  a  stronger  trade-off  and  the 
additional  prediction  that  long-run  unemployment  depends  positively  on  the  variance  of 
productivity growth. We employ two alternative strategies to bring these predictions to the data. 
The ﬁrst, based on U.S. data, extracts the trend component of unemployment and productivity 
growth and therefore exploits low-frequency variation over time. The second strategy, based on 
a panel of international data,  evaluates the  association between averages and variances of 
unemployment and  productivity growth for  windows  of ten  years and  therefore exploits  low-
frequency variation both over time and across countries. 
The empirical results show robust support for both predictions of the theoretical model: 
higher  volatility  of  productivity  growth  and  lower  levels  of  long-run  productivity  growth  are 
associated with higher levels of long-run unemployment. Moreover they are robust to controlling 
for demographic factors, which have been recently shown to inﬁuence long-run unemployment. 
The panel regressions reveal that variation over time is more important than variation across 
countries to explain this pattern. Movements in the variance of productivity growth, for instance, 
allows our model to account for two episodes in U.S. data which cannot be fully accounted for 
by a linear speciﬁcation in the trend of productivity growth only. These are: 
1)  the  fall  in  long-run  unemployment  during  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  and  early 
1990s; 
2)  the rise in long-run unemployment during the late 2000s. 
Our paper has also important policy implications. To the extent that stabilization policies 
played a signiﬁcant role in the Great Moderation, our theoretical and empirical ﬁndings highlight 
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Figure 7  Productivity growth, unemployment and real wage growth, quarterly data 
on sample 1949Q1:2010Q2. All data are in percent. Productivity growth and 








































Figure 8  Labor force shares for workers with age between 16 and 21, between 16 and 34, 
between 16 and 29 plus between 60 and 64, unemployment rate for workers with age 





































A stochastic volatility model 
The statistical model is a VAR(p) of the following form:  
(B.1) 
where Xt collects the ﬁrst p lags of Yt , θt is a matrix of time-varying parameters, et are reduced-
form errors, Yt is deﬁned as Yt ≡ [gt, Δwt, ut]', and p is set equal to 2. We stack the time-
varying VAR parameters in the vector θt, which is assumed to evolve as:  
(B.2)  
where I(θt) is an indicator function that takes a value of 0 when the roots of the associated VAR 
polynomial are inside the unit circle and is equal to 1 otherwise. 
f (θt | θt - 1, Q) is given by 
(B.3) 
with ηt ∼ N(0,Q). The VAR reduced-form innovations in (36) are postulated to be zeromean 
normally distributed, with time-varying covariance matrix Ωt which is factored as  
(B.4) 




with the elements hi,t evolving as geometric random walks:  
(B.6) 
Following Primiceri (2005), we postulate:  
(B.7) 






where ʵt is such that  
The model (B.1)-(B.8) is estimated using Bayesian methods (see Kim and Nelson (2000)). 
Full descriptions of the algorithm, including the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) used to 
simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional on the data, 
are provided in a number of papers (see, for instance, Cogley and Sargent, 2005, and Primiceri, 
2005) and will not be repeated here.   
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Even though one cannot characterize analytically the joint posterior distribution of the model 
parameters,  it  is  possible  to  construct  a  Markov  chain  whose  invariant  distribution  is  the 
posterior. The MCMC procedure draws from the marginal density of a set of random variables j, 
conditional on some realizations for another set of random variables i, and then drawing from 
the marginal distribution of i conditional on the realizations of j in the previous step. Under some 
assumption, the chain converge to an invariant density that equals the desired posterior density.  
The elements of S are assumed to follow an inverse-Wishart distribution centered at 2∗10
−3 
times the prior mean(s) of the relevant element(s) of the vector αt with the prior degrees of 
freedom  equal  to  the  minimum  allowed  The  priors  for  all  the  other  hyperparameters  are 
borrowed  from  Cogley  and  Sargent  (2005).  We  use  100000  Gibbs  sampling  replications, 





























In  ﬁgure  9,  we  plot  the  posterior  means  of  key  model  parameters.  These  statistics  are 
computed recursively as the average for every 20
th draw of the retained repetitions of the Gibbs 
sampler. The ﬁgure reveals that the ﬁuctuations in the posterior means are modest, thereby 





































The asymmetric real-wage rigidity model 








where we have used the results that (dwt(j))
2 = (dwt)
2 = dwt(j)dAt = dwt dAt = 0.
22 
From (D.9) and (D.10), the optimal value of πR,t(j) is implicitly deﬁned by the following condition 
 
 
 from which it follows that 
(D.11) 
 





where we have deﬁned                    and                      . Taking the derivative of (D.12) with 









where f1(·) is the derivative of f(·) with respect to its argument. 
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 The fact that dwt has the same properties of dwt(j) will follow from the symmetry of the equilibrium.  
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The downward real-wage rigidity model 
Let     the space of non-decreasing non-negative stochastic processes {wt(j)}. This is the 
space of processes that satisfy the constraint (30). First we show that the objective function is 
concave over a convex set. To show that the set is convex, note that            if and                then 




and π(·) is concave in the ﬁrst-argument, the objective function is concave in {wt(j)} since it is 
the integral of concave functions. Let {wt
*
 (j)} be a process belonging to        that maximizes 
(13) and V(·) the associated value function deﬁned by 
 
 
We now characterize the properties of the optimal process {w ∗(j)}. The Bellman  
We now characterize the properties of the optimal process {wt
*
 (j)}. The Bellman equation t 

















since dwt(j), and therefore also dwt, have ﬁnite variation implying (dwt(j))
2 = dwt(j) dwt = 
dwt(j)dAt = (dwt)
2 = dwtdAt = 0. We have deﬁned                         . Substituting (E.16) into 
(E.14) and maximizing over dwt(j) we obtain the complementary slackness condition: 
 
for each t and  
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Since the objective is concave and the set of constraints is convex, the optimal choice for 
wt(j) is unique. It follows that wt(j) = wt for each j. Moreover, super-contact conditions require 





It follows that we can write (E.17) as 
(E.18) 
 











when dwt > 0 while v(wt , At) ≤ 0 when dwt = 0. We now solve for the functions w(At) and 
v(wt  ,  At).  Thus  we  seek  for  functions  w(At)  and  v(wt  ,  At)  that  satisﬁes  (E.18)  and  the 










while in this case the complementary solution has the form 
 





Since when wt → ∞ and/or At → 0, the length of time until the next wage adjustment can 





which both require that γ should be positive. The general solution is then given by the sum of 



























Note that this is a set of three equations, two of which are independent.
23 They determine k 














which shows that 0 < c(g, ˃
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Derivation of equation (10) 
A generic ﬁrm i maximizes proﬁts given by 
(F.29) 




and the production technology 
  (F.31) 
 
















where µp ≡ θp/[(θp - 1)α] > 1. Notice that there exists a unique equilibrium for the optimal 
price pt(i), given Wt, Pt and Yt. Therefore the equilibrium is symmetric and pt(i) = Pt, yt(i) = Yt 
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